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I. INTRODUCTION
Edvard Munch's iconic masterpiece, "The Scream," became "the
world's most expensive work of art ever to sell at an auction."' The
famous painting sold for a record $119.9 million dollars at a Sotheby's
auction in 2012.2 Similarly, Pablo Picasso's famous oil painting, "Garcon
a la Pipe," which Picasso painted in 1905, was sold at a Sotheby's auction
in 2004 for a whopping $104,168,000 million.3 Picasso's painting was
first sold in 1950 for only $30,000.4 Edgar Degas, a French artist, first
sold his painting, "R6p6tition d'un Ballet," for only $100.5 The same
painting sold for $401,000 in 1965.6 Although the artistic styles of
Munch, Picasso, and Degas, are all extremely different, the three artists
share one thing in common: the significant rise in value of their works.
However, a common theme in the world of visual arts is the notion that
"great wealth in the arts has rarely translated into great wealth for the
artist."
One way to remedy this injustice faced by artists is by implementing
resale royalty right legislation in the United States. A resale royalty right,
or as the French call it, droit de suite, emphasizes the commonly known
injustice that Munch, Picasso, and Degas (or their estates) all
experienced. The injustice is that an artist's work may sell for a low
amount when created, and years later earn gallery owners and art
collectors millions of dollars, while the original artist receives nothing
from the proceeds.8 Essentially, droit de suite is the concept that artists,
their heirs, and their estates should receive a royalty every time one of
their works is resold. 9 This royalty right will allow artists to benefit from
the same copyright protections enjoyed by authors, as it will allow artists

1. Carol Vogel, 'The Scream' is Auctionedfor a Record $119.9 Million, N.Y. TIMES, May
2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/arts/design/the-scream-sells-for-nearly-120-millio
n-at-sothebys-auction.html.
2. Id.
3. Chris Wilson, Scream at the Prices: EdvardMunch's Record-Breakerand the Top 10
Most Expensive Artworks to ever go Under the Hammer, MIRROR, May 3, 2012, http://www.
mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/the-scream-sold-for-l 199million-and-the-top-1 0-816579.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Nithin Kumar, ConstitutionalHazard: The California Resale Royalty Act and the
Futility ofState-Level Implementation ofDroitde Suite Legislation, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 443,
443 (2014).
7. Id.
8. See Jon M. Garon, Commercializing the Digital Canvas: Renewing Rights of
Attributionfor Artists, Authors, and Performers, I TEX. A&M L. REV. 837, 842 (2014).
9. Tiernan Morgan & Lauren Purje, An IllustratedGuide to Artist Resale Royalties (aka
'Droitde Suite'), HYPERALLERGIC (Oct. 24, 2014), http://hyperallergic.com/153681/an-illustrate
d-guide-to-artist-resale-royalties-aka-droit-de-suite/.
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to commercialize their works for profit. 10 The injustice currently felt by
artists who are deprived of a resale royalty right in the works is real. In
the words of painter Robert Rauschenberg to art collector Robert Scull,
who purchased Rauschenberg's painting "Thaw" for $900 and resold it
ten years later for $85,000, "I've been working my ass off just for you to
make that profit!"'
While the United States has not recognized droit de suite through any
federal legislation, the right has been acknowledged by the U.S.
Copyright Office and at the state level.1 2 California was the first and only
state to implement a statewide droit de suite statute, which recently fell
short of constitutional support.1 3 The California court's recent strike
down of California's droit de suite statute constitutes a strong indication
that a droit de suite law cannot survive at the state level, and federal
legislation is needed to fill in the gaps in which the California law fell
short. If Congress is to adopt federal legislation implementing a resale
royalty right for artists, it will address and repair the injustice faced by
artists, such as the ones felt by Munch, Picasso, Degas, and
Rauschenberg. Furthermore, it will fulfill the original intent of the
Copyright Clause of the Constitution by acknowledging a moral, as well
as an economic incentive for creators of fine art.' 4 Finally, federal
legislation will bring the United States into harmony with the other
members of the Beme Convention, as the implementation of a resale
royalty law will allow American artists to benefit from the resale of their
work in the United States, as well as abroad."
First, this Article will review the general history of moral rights and
the origins of droit de suite, touching into its French origins. Second, this
article will examine the legal justifications and internationalization of the
droit de suite right. Next, this Article will thoroughly analyze the U.S.
attempts at enacting a droit de suite right, including a discussion on the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, the California Resale Royalties Act,
the Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, and the American Royalties
Too Act of 2014. This Article will then walk through the background
history of federal legislation governing resale royalty rights in the United
States, and will analyze the recent legislative attempts made by Congress
to enact such a right. Finally, this Article will review the most recent
report of the U.S. Copyright Office on resale royalties, and will review
and rebut the criticisms of enacting a resale royalty right in the United
10.

Id.

11.

Michael B. Reddy, The Droit De Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should have the

Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 509, 509, 521 (1995).
12. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 2014).
13. See Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
14. Reddy, supra note 11, at 512.
15. Id.
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States, ultimately arguing that the United States should enact a federal
resale royalty law for visual artists.
II. THE ORIGINS OF DROIT DE SUITE

A. The Concept of MoralRights

'

To appreciate the concept of droit de suite, it is imperative to
understand the doctrine of moral rights. Droit de suite is rooted in
France's moral rights jurisprudence.1 6 Poetically speaking, the moral
rights doctrine enables one to know "the dancer from the dance."' 7 The
treatise of Entertainment Law defines the doctrine of moral rights as
"[tihe doctrine which purports to protect the personal rights of creators,
as distinguished from their merely economic rights . . . ."18 Essentially,
this doctrine represents that an artist retains an interest in her art that
surpasses the physical embodiment of the work itself.1 9 An artist's moral
right in her work is best illustrated as the idea that although the artist may
sell or part ways with her work, the artist still retains the reputation in the
work itself and the "pride of authorship" of the work.2 0
Moral rights protect the non-pecuniary interests of an artist's work.2
"France is considered the leader in.. . moral rights ... [as]the term 'moral
right' is a rough translation of the French term 'droit moral."' 22 Moral
rights in France are considered "independent from and superior to any
pecuniary interest in a work of art." 2 This ideology contrasts from the
law of United States, which "seeks to protect primarily the author's
pecuniary and exploitative interests." 2 The moral rights doctrine
typically protects five rights: attribution, integrity, disclosure,
withdrawal, and resale royalties.2 5

16.
17.
2004).

Id at 513.
William B. Yeats, Among School Children, in THE TOWER, 25 (1928) (A Facsimile ed.

18.

THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS

PRACTICES § 20:27 (3d ed. 2014).
19. Id.
20. Id
21. Sarah C. Anderson, Decontextualization of Musical Works: Should the Doctrine of
MoralRights be Extended?, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 869, 871 (2006).
22. Id.
23. Id at 873.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 872.
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B. Droitde Suite, Specifically: An Artist's Resale Rights
Rootedfrom the Concept of Moral Rights
France was the first country to recognize a resale royalty right for
artists, as French courts gradually began to acknowledge that artists'
moral rights in their works were fundamentally different from their
economic rights in them.16 Once French courts held that an artist
possessed a permanent relationship with his or her art, French law started
recognizing four perpetual and inalienable rights that all artists are
entitled to: (1) the right of paternity (droit a lapaternite);(2) the right of
integrity (droit au respect de l'oeuvre); (3) the right to release (droit de
divulgation); and (4) the right to withdraw or modify (droit de retrait ou
de repentir).2 7 Since its origins in France in the 1920s, droit de suite is
now included in its own article of the Berne Convention, and seventynine countries have proactively implemented some form of droit de suite
law. 28
Although France first recognized the concept of droitde suite in 1920,
it was not implemented into French copyright law until 1957.29 Since its
enactment, French fine artists are able to recover a royalty from the
proceeds of any resale of their work.30 This resale royalty is the right of
an artist to be compensated with a percentage of the sales proceeds of any
subsequent sale of her work.3 1 In essence, droit de suite is a union
between moral rights and an author's pecuniary rights because it
incorporates the inalienable right of paternity and the right to participate
in the future economic exploitation of a work.3 2
C. The Legal Justification ofDroit de Suite
The rights granted to artists through the Copyright Act are derived
from the U.S. Constitution. Article I Section 8, Clause 8 of the
Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
26.
27.

See Reddy, supra note 11, at 513.
Id. at 514.

28.

See OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S.

COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RESALE

ROYALTIES: AN UPDATED ANALYSIS, app. E (2013), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/resaleroyalt

y/usco-resaleroyalty.pdf [hereinafter 2013 REPORT].
29.

Katerina Eden, Fine Artists' Resale Royalty Right Should be Enacted in the United

States, 18 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 121, 124 (2005); Reddy, supra note I1, at 509-10.
30. Reddy, supra note 11, at 510.
31. Edensupranote 29, at 121.
32. Reddy, supra note 11, at 510. The Berne Convention recognizes the paternity right as
a principle feature of the moral rights principle. William Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author,
COPYRIGHT LAW. REVISION 109, 116 (1959), http://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study4.

pdf. The paternity right consists of "the author's right to be made known to the public as the
creator of his work, to prevent others from usurping his work by naming another person as the
author, and to prevent others from wrongfully attributing to him a work he has not written." Id.
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Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries[.]" 3 3 The goal of the American copyright system is
essentially to promote the dissemination of knowledge to enhance public
welfare. 34 This goal is accomplished by providing an economic incentive
to creators in the form of a monopoly right for a limited amount of time. 3 5
The Supreme Court of the United States rationalized this ideology in
Mazer v. Stein, stating, "[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in
'Science and useful Arts."' 36 However, in civil law countries such as
France, copyright law is more individual-centered, aiming to protect an
artist's pecuniary and exploitative rights, as well as her moral and
intellectual rights.3 7
Notwithstanding the differences between American and French
copyright laws, it is well established that, "[a]uthors are the heart of
copyright." 38 As evidenced in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
Constitution, authors are undeniably "the constitutional subjects of
copyright." 39 Furthermore, the Copyright Act of 1976 states that,
"[c]opyright protection subsists . . in original works of authorship... ."
and that, "[c]opyright in a work ... vests initially in the author or authors
of the work." 4 1 Arguably, copyright law in the United States "does not
seek merely to promote the distribution of works to the public. It also
aims to foster their creation." 42 This incentive for creation, therefore,
induces U.S. copyright law to acknowledge and incentivize an artist's
moral right in her work.4 3 However, the concept of moral rights, which is
a feature found in countries with civil law systems, such as France, does
not share the same weight of importance in common law countries, such
§ 8, cl. 8.

33.

U.S. CONST. art. 1,

34.

Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors' Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and

Morality ofFrenchandAmericanLaw Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549,555 (2006).
35. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 6 (4th ed. 2005); Piotraut,
supra note 34, at 554.

36. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
37. Piotraut, supra note 34, at 555. French copyright law favors the principles of natural
justice, which relates to a jurisprudential tradition, which requires laws to comply with universal
principles of truth and morality. Id. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER,
JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW 170 (1987).

38.

Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52

DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2003).
39. Id. at 1068.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
42. Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 1064.
43.

Piotraut, supra note 34, at 558.
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as the United States.44
If creators are the heart of copyright law, it is critical that the United
States implement federal legislation that recognizes and compensates
them for the moral rights in their work. The United States can accomplish
this by enacting a federal droit de suite statute that would secure to artists
a percentage of the increase in value of a work whenever the work is
resold.4 5 Current copyright law grants to authors certain exclusive rights
in their creations.4 6 These rights extend in some instances. For example,
musical works receive a public performance right and a distribution right
that provide the means for a writer to receive royalties for public
performances and for the sales of copies of the work.47
The current Copyright Act fails to provide the same economic
incentives for artists that create visual works, as it does for authors and
composers. Visual artists are compensated only for the initial sale of their
work and have no reproduction rights in their work.4 8 It is necessary that
creators of fine art receive a royalty for the resale of their work because,
unlike authors and composers who can generate limitless copies of their
work, an artist who creates fine art can create only one. 49 Therefore, just
as copyright law allows authors to bargain for future royalties from the
reproduction of multiple copies of their work, a federal droit de suite
44. Id. at 597. Most nations today follow either a common law or a civil law legal tradition.
The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, THE ROBBINS COLLECTION, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAw, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/robbins/

CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2015). Common law is generally
uncodified, and it is largely based on judicial precedent. Id In contrast, civil law is codified, and
countries that follow a civil law system have comprehensive and continuously updated legal codes
that are specific about each matter brought before a court. Id.
45. Michael E. Horowitz, Artists 'Rights in the UnitedStates: Toward FederalLegislation,
25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 157 (1988).

46.

See 17 U.S.C.

§ 106 (2012).

47. Neel Chatterjee, Imperishable Intellectual Creations: The Limits of the First Sale
Doctrine, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 383, 386-87 (1995). Section 106 of the

Copyright Act states the owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights,
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare
derivative works based upon the .

.

. work; (3) to distribute copies .

copyrighted work to the public by sale ... ; (4) in the case of ...

.

. of the

audiovisual

works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) . . . to display the

copyrighted work publicly; and (6) . .

to perform the copyrighted work publicly.

17 U.S.C. § 106. (2012). Section 113(a) of the Copyright Act provides that, "the exclusive right
to reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic or sculptural work in copies under section 106
includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise."

17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012).
48.

Elliott Alderman, Resale Royalties in the UnitedStatesfor Fine Visual Artists: An Alien

Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 265, 273 (1992).
49. Id.
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statute in the United States will provide similar compensation for artists.5 0
The U.S. Copyright Office agrees. In its December 2013 report on
resale royalties, the Copyright Office acknowledged that visual artists do
not reap the long-term benefits and financial gains from the resale of their
works, and the Office is in support of a federal resale royalty right statute
to compensate for the imbalance in treatment of artists under current
copyright law. 5' The 2013 Report recognizes that the income available to
visual artists, such as painters, illustrators, sculptors, and photographers,
is more limited than it is to other authors through reproduction and
derivative uses of their works. 52 The 2013 Report noted that it is
"common ground that reproduction rights represent a 'very minor aspect
of [most artists'] careers' and that the first sale of a work is 'the main or
exclusive source of income for almost all American artists."' 53
The Copyright Office made several recommendations and
observations regarding the enactment of a resale royalty statute. The
Office noted that the Copyright Act grants artists the same exclusive
rights as authors, but due to the singular nature of a visual artist's work,
discrepancies arise between the exclusive rights enjoyed by authors and
the rights received by artists, as a visual artist's work is valued for its oneof-a-kind nature. 54 Furthermore, through its observations, the Office
pointed out that there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that a resale
royalty statute will harm the U.S. visual art market. 5 The Office did,
however, recommend that should Congress act on implementing a resale
royalty statute in the United States, it should do so with caution, as
adoption of a resale royalty statute is not the only option under the law to
address the disparate treatment of artists. 56
D. The InternationalizationofDroitde Suite.
Soon after France implemented a droit de suite statute into law, other
countries such as Belgium and Czechoslovakia enacted similar resale
royalty right laws.5 7 Due to its recognition across several European
nations, France recommended a droit de suite provision be added to the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works at the
1928 conference in Rome.5 8 A droit de suite article was finally included
50.

Eden, supra note 29, at 123.

51.

2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 1-2.

52. Id.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id. at 3.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id. The Berne Convention is a treaty administered by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) that governs the international protection of works and the rights of their
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in the Berne Convention at the 1948 Brussels revision conference;
however, because several countries opposed the addition of such a right
to the Convention, the article encompassing the resale royalty right is
optional and reciprocal to all Member States.59 Because of its optional
nature, the United States is not required to enforce the droit de suite right
in its domestic copyright law; however, due to its omission in enacting
the right, artists in the United States are barred from receiving any
royalties from the sale of their work in any Member States that have
implemented the resale royalty right in their respective countries. 6 0

III. DROIT DE SUITE EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Although the United States has not passed a federal droit de suite
statute into law, federal lawmakers have discussed adopting resale royalty
legislation for several years. 6 1 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the resale
royalty right gained much attention in the United States, as several
scholarly articles discussing the resale royalty trend in Europe were
published.6 2 The event that triggered the closest possibility of resale
royalty legislation in the United States stemmed from an incident
involving artist Robert Rauschenberg in the 1970s. 6 3 The incident arose
when Rauschenberg publicly chastised an art collector who resold one of
Rauschenberg's works for over $85,000 at a public auction, after
purchasing it from Rauschenberg for only $900.64 Many artists were
extremely offended by the Rauschenberg incident, and within five years

authors for all WIPO member states. Summary of the Berne Conventionfor the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (1886), WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/beme/summary_berne.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).

59. 2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 4-5. The droit de suite provision in the Berne
Convention is optional and may be adopted by a WIPO Member State if the state elects to;
however, in order to receive the benefits from the right in other countries, a Member State needs

to implement the right because the right is reciprocal. Id. Chapter II, Article 7 of International
Copyright Law and Practice on Third-country nationals entitled to receive royalties provides that,
"(1) Member States shall provide that authors who are nationals of third countries . .. shall enjoy
the resale right in accordance with . . . the legislation of the Member State concerned only if
legislation in the country of which the author or his/her successor in title is a national permits
resale right protection in that country for authors from the Member States and their successors in
title." INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, at Eu-app. 8, ch. 2, art. 7 (Lionel Bently

et al. eds., NexisMatthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2015) (1988).
60.
61.

2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 5.
Stephanie B. Turner, The Artist's Resale Royalty Right: Overcoming the Information

Problem, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 329, 338 (2012).
62. Id. at 336.
63. Id. at 338.
64. John Henry Merryman, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 103,
109-11 (1993).
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after this event occurred, resale royalty legislation arose in several
states.6 5

A. The FirstStep Toward DroitDe Suite in the United States: The U.S.
Recognition ofMoral Rights via the Visual Artists Rights Act Of1990.
The United States first recognized an artist's moral rights in her work
when Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA),
which President George H.W. Bush signed into law after the United
States joined the Berne Convention. 66 Prior to VARA, U.S. copyright law
was primarily focused on the economic protection of visual artists rather
than the protection of a visual artist's moral rights.6 7 Even though VARA
recognizes an artist's moral rights in her work, the moral rights protected
under the statute are limited.68 Section 2 of VARA defines a work of
visual art as:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single
copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed
and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a
sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200
or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear
the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes
only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author.6 9

65.

Turner, supra note 61, at 338.

66.

Geri J. Alison, B.L.J. 79, 80 (1996); Alison B. Friedberg, Work in Progress:

Reconciling VARA, Unfinished Works, andthe Moral Rights ofArtists, 13 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 217,218 (2010); Geri J. Yonover, The PrecariousBalance:Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair

Use, 14 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 80-81 (1996). The moral rights provision is found in
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and it was
&

adopted at the Rome Convention of 1928. Natalie C. Suhl, Moral Rights Protectionin the United
States Under the Berne Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA

ENT. L.J. 1203, 1212 (2002). Article 6bis subsection (1) states that "[i]ndependently of the author's
economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of,
or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work . . ." Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, of September 9 1886, art. 6bis, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume% 20828/v828.pdf. Article 6bis also
provides for moral rights after the author's death and a means of redress for safeguarding the
rights under Article 6bis. Id.
67. Friedberg, supra note 66, at 218.
68. Id at 219.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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The statute also specifies what a work of visual art does not include,
such as a poster, map, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual
work, book, magazine, newspaper, and electronic publication, to name a
few of its exclusions. 70 Furthermore, VARA includes only those works
created after the statute's enactment on June 1, 1991, and only for the
lifetime of the artist plus fifty years.7 1 With respect to the moral rights of
the artist, VARA provides that the author of a visual work has the right
of attribution and integrity and the right to prevent any intentional
distortion or destruction of her work.72 Under VARA, attribution includes
the
[r]ights to claim authorship of a work, to prevent attachment of an
artist's name to a work which he did not create, and, where there
has been a subsequent distortion, mutilation, or modification of the
work prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation, the right to
disclaim authorship and to prevent identification of the artist's
name with the work.
B. The CaliforniaResale Royalties Act
California was the only state in the United States to pass a resale
royalty statute at the state level.7 4 In September 1976, the governor of
California signed into law the California Resale Royalties Act (CRRA),
which authorized the first and only droit de suite legislation in the United
States. The CRRA, codified in Section 968 of the California Civil Code,
provided that:
(a) Whenever a work of fine art is sold and the seller resides in
California or the sale takes place in California, the seller or the
seller's agent shall pay to the artist of such work of fine art or to
such artist's agent 5 percent of the amount of such sale. The right
70. See id.
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012); Friedberg, supra note 66, at 220.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 106A. The right of attribution is an artist's "right to claim authorship of a
work he or she created." Friedberg, supra note 66, at 220. Under the rights of attribution and
integrity, an author "shall have the right to claim authorship of that work; and ... shall have the
right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a

distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her
honor or reputation." § 106A (a)(1)-(2).
73. Cynthia Esworthy, A Guide to the Visual Artists Rights Act, http://www.law.harvard.
edu/faculty/martin/artlaw/esworthy.htm.
74. 2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 20.
75. Toni Mione, Resale Royalties for Visual Artists: The United States Taking Cues from
Europe, 21 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 461, 467 (2013); see); see Carole M. Vickers, The
Applicability of the Droit de Suite in the United States, 3 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 433, 444

(1980), availableat http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.eduliclr/vol3/iss2/5.
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of the artist to receive an amount equal to 5 percent of the amount
of such sale may be waived only by a contract in writing providing
for an amount in excess of 5 percent of the amount of such sale.
An artist may assign the right to collect the royalty payment
provided by this section to another individual or entity. However,
the assignment shall not have the effect of creating a waiver
prohibited by this subdivision. 76
The CRRA also imposed many restrictions prior to the actual payment
of a resale royalty to an artist. In order to recover a percentage of the
proceeds from a resale of a work under the CRRA, (1) the sales price of
the work resold must amount to more than $1,000;n7 (2) the resale of the
work must be more than the purchase price initially paid by the seller;78
(3) the resale by an art dealer to a purchaser cannot be within ten years of
the initial sale of the work by the artist to an art dealer; 79 (4) the artist
must be a citizen of the United States, or a resident of the California for
at least two years;80 (5) the work must fall under the statute's definition
of "fine art," which according to the statute means, "an original painting,
sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass;" 8 ' and (6) either
the seller must reside in California, or the sale of fine art must be executed
in California. 82 Furthermore, under the CRRA, the burden was on the
seller to locate and pay the artist the appropriate royalty percentage for
the resale of the work, and if the seller could not locate the artist, the
statute stated that 5% of the amount of the sale was to be transferred to
the California Arts Council, where the burden then shifted to the Arts
Council to locate the original artist.83
Although artists were satisfied that California enacted a droit de suite
statute, many others criticized the law, which criticisms later proved to
have legitimate legal merit.8 4 Some of the criticisms that the CRRA faced
concerned the statute's application "to sales outside of California;"
"application to sales by dealers and to private sales;" and "giving the artist
5% of the gross resale price rather than a percentage of the profit, if any,

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 2014).
Id § 986(b)(2).
Id. § 986(b)(4).
Id. § 986(b)(6).
Id. § 986(c)(1).
Id. § 986(c)(2).
Id § 986(a).
Id § 986(a)(1)-(2).

84. M. Elizabeth Petty, Rauschenberg, Royalties, and Artists' Rights: PotentialDroit de
Suite Legislation in the United States, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 977, 990 (2014); but). But

see Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that the
California Resale Royalties Act violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution).
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on the resale." 8 s Furthermore, with respect to the actual implementation
of the CRRA, artists faced challenges in collecting the royalties from
resale, asking Congress to step in and pass a federal law to govern such
resale royalties. 86
The constitutionality of the CRRA was challenged shortly after the
statute's enactment in Morseburgv. Balyon. In Morseburg, an art dealer
brought suit challenging the CRRA's constitutionality, claiming that the
1909 Copyright Act preempted the California statute, and that the statute
violated the Due Process and Contracts Clauses of the Constitution.87 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both of these claims,
and upheld the CRRA, referred to as "an American version of what the
French call the droit de suite, an art proceeds right." 88 In its opinion, the
Ninth Circuit recognized that "works of fine art" are the types of work
where "the sales proceeds realized by the artist upon its first sale are
significantly less than the prices at which it subsequently changes
hands."89 While the court noted several explanations for this
phenomenon, such as greater recognition for the artist after the work
leaves the artist's hands, an increase in the overall demand for artwork,
inflation, and shifts in fashion or taste, 90 none of these rationalizations
seemed to justify the injustice faced by artists. The court reasoned that
the Copyright Clause did not prevent the enactment of the CRRA, and
the Copyright Act did not preempt California's state law because none of
the rights provided for in the CRRA were found in the Copyright Act,
and the CRRA merely provided an additional right to artists.91
Furthermore, the court held that section 27 of the 1909 Copyright Act did
not preclude the enactment of resale royalty acts by individual states,
reasoning that works can be transferred without restriction, and "[t]he fact
that a resale may create a liability to the creator artist or a state
instrumentality and, at the same time, constitute an exercise of a right
guaranteed by the Copyright Act does not make the former a legal
restraint on the latter." 92 For preemption to apply, the court explained
85.

Petty, supra note 84, at 991.

86. Id.
87. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1980). On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit explicitly limited its decision to the 1909 Copyright Act and not the more recent 1976
Copyright Act because the transactions that initiated this action too place prior to the Copyright
Act of 1976. See 2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 21.
88. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 974-76.
89. Id. at 975.
90. Id. at 976.
91. Id at 977.
92. Id. at 977-78. Section 27 of the 1909 Copyright Act provides, "[t]hat the proceedings
for an injunction, damages, and profits, and those for the seizure of infringing copies, plates,
molds, matrices, and so forth, aforementioned, may be united in one action." Copyright Act of
1909, § 27.ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 § 27 (amended 1976).
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that, "[t]he crucial inquiry is not whether state law reaches matters also
subject to federal regulation, but whether the two laws function
harmoniously . . . " with each other, and in this case the court held that
the two laws did.9 3 The court also rejected the argument that the CRRA
violated the Contracts and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.9 4
C. Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's, Inc.-The Case that Officially
Declaredthat the CaliforniaResale Royalties Act Violated the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution
After the court in Morseburg held that the Copyright Act of 1909 did
not preem t the CRRA, the Supreme Court denied certiorarito review
the issue. 5 Following Morseburg, no challenges were raised against
California's Resale Royalty Right Law for several years. 96 However, that
changed in 2011 when several artists began filing lawsuits in California
against auction houses, alleging that these auction houses were violating
the CRRA, and leading to the case that determined the fate of the CRRA:
Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's Inc.. 97
In Sotheby 's, the plaintiffs, who were a group of artists and their
estates, brought a class action against two world-renowned auction
houses, both incorporated in New York and both with principal places of
business in New York, for failing to comply with the CRAA by failing to
pay the resale royalty that is provided for under the CRAA. A punitive
class action complaint was filed on October 18, 2011 by the Sam Francis
Foundation, the Estate of Robert Graham, Chuck Close, Laddie John Dill,
and on behalf of all others similarly situated against Christie's, Inc., an
auction house incorporated in New York with its principal place of
93. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 978.
94. Id. at 978-80.
95. See Morseburg v. Baylon, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
96. See Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012); but).
But see Robert H. Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 3d 637, 644 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that architectural plans are not "fine art" within the meaning of the California
Resale Royalties Act, and in the absence of legislative expression to include architectural plans,
the CRRA bars recovery of a royalty for the resale of such works); Simons v. Horowitz, 151 Cal.
App. 3d 834, 843 (Dist. Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an individual defendant art dealer was
not required to make an appearance prior to filing his notice of appeal, to obtain permission to
intervene in matter, to make motion for new trial, or to be designated as class representative in
order to have standing to appear on behalf of interests of rest of alleged defendant class on appeal
from judgment ordering each defendant class member to account for and pay each member of
plaintiff class commissions due on sales of fine art, since there was an absence of effective
representation of defendant class by designated representative).
97. See Estate Sotheby's, 860 F. Supp. 2d I117, at 1126; see also Sam Francis Found. v.
eBay Inc., No. 2:1 1-cv-08622-JHN-PLA, 2012 WL 12294395 (C.D. May 17, 2012); Sam Francis
Found. v. Christie's Inc., No. 2:1 1-cv-08605-JHN-FFM (C.D. Cal. May, 17, 2012).
98. Sotheby's, 860 F. Supp. 2d at I119.
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business in New York.9 9 The complaint alleged that Christie's sold works
of fine art on behalf of California sellers and failed to comply with the
CRRA by not making the appropriate royalty payments, and it also
alleged that Christie's violated California's Unfair Competition Law by
engaging in unlawful business practices by improperly retaining funds
that did not belong to it. 00
In response to this class action lawsuit, auction houses Christie's,
Sotheby's, and eBay responded in a joint motion to dismiss, arguing that
the CRRA violated the Constitution by attempting to regulate interstate
commerce. 10 1 In its motion to dismiss, Sotheby's stated, "[b]ecause the
CRRA expressly regulates commerce outside California, it violates the
[C]ommerce [C]lause per se, and the court need look no further to dismiss
plaintiffs' claims based on out-of-state auction sales."' 0 2 The defendants'
main argument was that "by purporting to regulate transactions that take
place wholly outside of California, the CRRA violate[d] the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution."103 The auction houses also
argued that the CRRA effectuated a taking of private property, thus
violating the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, and that the federal
Copyright Act's first sale doctrine barred the resale royalty demands by
the artists.1 04

The court in Sotheby 's held that the CRRA did in fact violate the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and it therefore did not address the
defendants' preemption and Taking Clause arguments. 0 5 The Commerce
Clause of the Constitution provides that, "[t]he Congress shall have
Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce among the several States . . ."106 The
court quoted prior precedent stating, "[a]lthough the Commerce Clause
is phrased as an affirmative grant of regulatory power to Congress, the
Supreme Court . .. has long interpreted the Clause to have a 'negative
aspect,' referred to as the dormant Commerce Clause . . . ."'o7 The
dormant Commerce Clause acts as a "limitation upon the power of the
States," by holding in prior jurisprudence that States do not have the
"power [to] unjustifiably. . . discriminate against or burden the interstate
flow of articles of commerce." 0 8
99. Class Action Complaint at 1-2, Sam Francis Found. v. Christie's, Inc., No. 2:1 1-CV08605-SVW (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011).
100. Id.at2-4,7-10.
101.

Megan Leonhardt, Christie'sSotheby's, eBay Say Calif Royalties Law Illegal, COOLEY

(Jan. 13, 2012), https://www.cooley.com/showinthenews.aspx?Show-66054.cooley.
102. Id.
103. Sotheby's, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
104. Id. at 1119.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1122 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
107. Id. (quoting Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 2002)).
108. Id.; Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640, (1982) (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
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To determine whether the CRRA violated the dormant Commerce
Clause, the court first had to decide whether the CRRA regulated an
activity that was subject to federal control.1 09 With respect to activity that
Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court
has identified three broad categories where Congress may regulate: "(1)
the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and
110
(3) 'those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce."'
Regarding the CRRA, the court first found that works of fine art
constitute "things" in interstate commerce, and therefore, Congress may
regulate transactions where works of fine art are sold from one state into
another."' Second, the court found that the CRRA substantially affected
interstate commerce, considering the fact that the statute had an effect on
commerce by providing "economic regulation to promote artistic
endeavors generally."ll 2 The Supreme Court has held in prior precedent
that Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause power so long as "in
the aggregate the economic activity in question would represent a general
practice ... subject to federal control.""1 3 The court in Sotheby 's used this
reasoning to find that the dormant Commerce Clause applied to the
CRRA because "[w]hen the number of art sale transactions throughout
the United States that the CRRA purports to regulate are considered in
the aggregate, [there is] little doubt that the CRRA has a 'substantial
effect' on interstate commerce such that Congress could regulate the
activity."' 14
After the court in Sotheby 's found that the dormant Commerce Clause
applied to the CRRA, it had to determine whether the California statute
violated it.' 1 5 In order to make this determination, the court had to decide

whether the CRRA either "(1) directly regulates interstate commerce; (2)
discriminates against interstate commerce; or (3) favors instate economic
interests over out-of-state interests."ll 6 The court held that the CRRA
violated the Commerce Clause per se.1 " Its rationale for holding that the
CRAA violated the Commerce Clause derived from Supreme Court
Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71, 96 S. Ct. 923, 47 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1976)); Sothebys, Inc.
860 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98,
114 S. Ct. 1345, 128 L. Ed. 2d 13 (1994)).
109. Sotheby's, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.
110. Id. at 1122-23.
111. Id. at 1123.
112. Id. (quoting Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 1980)).
113. Id. (quoting Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56-57, 123 S. Ct. 2037, 156
L. Ed. 2d 46 (2003)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1124.
117. Id. at 112 5.
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precedent that held "a statute that directly controls commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the
enacting State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether the
statute's extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature.""" The
court stated that "[t]he 'critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of
the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State,"'
and with respect to the CRRA, the court held that it did just that by
explicitly regulating applicable sales of fine art occurring wholly outside
California." 9 The court stated, "[u]nder its clear terms, the CRRA
regulates transactions occurring anywhere in the United States, so long
as the seller resides in California. Even the artist-the intended
beneficiary of the CRRA-does not have to be a citizen of, or reside in,
California." 20 The court found the possible reach of the CRRA was
problematic, and illustrated the problematic effect through an example:
Assume a California resident places a painting by a New York artist
up for auction at Sotheby's in New York, and at the auction a New York
resident purchases the painting for $1,000,000. In such a situation, the
transaction that the CRRA regulates-the one between the New York
auction house and the New York purchaser-occurs wholly in New York.
Despite the fact that even the artist receiving the royalty is a New York
resident, the CRRA reaches out to New York and regulates the
transaction by mandating that Sotheby's (1) withhold $50,000 (i.e., 5% of
the auction sale price); (2) locate the artist; and (3) remit the $50,000 to
the New York artist. Should Sotheby's in New York fail to comply, the
New York artist may bring a legal action under California law (the
CRRA) to recover the applicable royalty. If the artist cannot be located,
Sotheby's must send the money withheld in the transaction to the
California Arts Council.121
In this case the court found that the defendants, both New York
corporations, were subjected to California law just by selling artwork
owned by a California seller, even when the transaction took place in
New York and when the beneficiary of the 5% royalty was a New York
artist.122

To rebut the defendant's Defendant's Commerce Clause argument,
plaintiffs relied heavily on the Ninth Circuit's prior precedent in
Morseburg, arguing that the court "rejected constitutional challenges
brought against the [CRRA]." 2 3 However, the court in this case
addressed the dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the CRIRA as one
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1124 (quoting Healey v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
Id.
Id; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(c)(1).
Id
Id at 1125.
Id at 1122.
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of first impression.12 4 The court held that Morseburg did not control
because Morseburg involved a preemption challenge to the CRRA with
respect to the 1909 Copyright Act only, whereas this case involved a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the CRRA.1 2 5 For these reasons,
the court held that the CRRA had the 'practical effect' of controlling
commerce 'occurring wholly outside the boundaries' of California even
though it may have some 'effects within the State."' Furthermore, with
respect to the validity of the CRRA as a whole, the court found that the
provisions of the CRRA that violated the Commerce Clause could not be
severed from the rest of the statute.1 26 Therefore, the court concluded that
the entire CRRA statute was invalid because it violated the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.1 27 This decision is currently on appeal in the
Ninth Circuit and is going to be reheard by the entire court en banc.128
D. Legislative History ofDroit de Suite in the UnitedStates
1. Legislative History of the CRRA, Specifically
The court's ultimate ruling that the CRRA was invalid because it
violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution did not come at much
surprise. With respect to the legislative history of the CRRA, the initial
statute introduced on April 2, 1975 sought to provide a resale royalty only
when "an original work of fine art [was] sold at an auction or by a gallery
or museum in California."l29 However, the legislature abandoned the
original language of the bill and drafted an amended version that provided
the CRRA applied "[w]henever a work of fine art [was] sold and the
buyer or the seller resides in California or the sale takes place in
California."'130 The bill's language was amended again and eventually
adopted "to require a resale royalty for sales outside of California where
the 'seller resides in California.'"131
California's own legislative counsel recognized the extraterritorial
reach of the CRRA when the law was being considered by the California
legislature in August of 1976.132 In an opinion letter on the CRRA's
initial proposal, legislative counsel George H. Murphy wrote that
"[w]hile the state has a legitimate local interest in furthering the fiscal
rights of artists within thisthis state, we find little such interest where the
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1125-26.
See Sam Francis Found. v. Christie's, Inc., 769 F.3d 1195, 1195 (9th Cir. 2014).
Sotheby's, 860 F.Supp.2d at 1126.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 124.
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artist resides out of the state orcountry."l 3 3 Furthermore, the legislative
counsel warned that "the application of the CRRA to 'out-of-state sales
... would be invalid under the [C]ommerce [C]lause,"' and that the bill
"would constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce in
contravention of the Federal Constitution in its application to sales which
occur outside the State of California."' 3 4 Despite the opinions of the
California legislative counsel, the CRRA was ultimately adopted with
these extraterritorial implications and the reasons for doing so seemed
"obvious" to some;' 35 defendants in Sotheby's argued in oral argument
that the legislature's decision to include extraterritorial language in the
statute was because if "the CRRA [was] to apply only to sales occurring
in California, the art market would surely have fled the state to avoid
paying the 5% royalty."' 3 6
With respect to the actual application of the CRRA and statistics
reporting compensation paid under the CRRA, several artists reported
that the statute provided them with a significant financial gain; however,
the law was also widely criticized as "underused" and "underenforced,"
and a 1986 survey of California artists and dealers was inconclusive on
any statistical data relating to the royalties actually paid under the
CRRA.1 3 7 One source criticized the CRRA for entrusting the distribution
of royalties to a government agency "with an incentive to hold on to
funds," reporting that the California Arts Council distributed only
$256,144 in royalties to 319 artists from the statute's enactment up to the
statute's demise in 2012.138 Furthermore, according to a survey of artists
that was conducted ten years after the CRRA was enacted, 32% of
respondents reported that "'dealers had refused to give them the name or
address of the buyer or even the resale price."" Additional criticisms of
the CRRA centered on the fact that the payment of royalties under the
statute was contingent upon an artist's knowledge that a resale was taking
place;' 4 0 if a seller never informed an artist of the resale of the artist's
work of art, the artist would have no way of learning that such a resale
took place, and thus, would not collect the appropriate royalty associated
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1124-25.
Id at 1125-26.
Id. at 1126.
Id

137. See OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Droit de Suite:
The Artist's Resale Royalty, at v (1992), http://www.copyright.gov/history/droit-de-suite.pdf
[hereinafter 1992 REPORT].
138. Ian Holubiak, Droit de Suite: Art Resellers Take a Hit After CaliforniaRoyalty Statute,
N.Y CongressmanJerroldNadler Takes Case National, CLASSICALITE (Mar. 3, 2014, 2:35 PM),

http://www.classicalite.com/articles/6408/20140303/art-resellers-take-a-hit-after-california-resal
e-royalty-statue-jerrod-nadler-takes-case-national.htm.
139. Turner, supranote 61, at 361-62.
140. Id. at 361.
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with the resale.141 After California passed the CRRA, several other states,
including Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas, introduced droit
de suite legislation in their respective states.1 4 2 However, none of these
states adopted a droit de suite statute as state law due to its unknown
impact on the art market, and because the law posed several legal
questions regarding its validity.1 43
2. Background History of Federal Legislation Governing Resale
Royalty Rights in the United States
The United States has considered implementing a federal droit de
suite statute for several years.1 44 Proposals for droit de suite legislation in
the United States began in the early 1960s.1 45 Several bills were proposed
in the mid-i 970s that covered resale royalties and moral rights for visual
artists. 146 In 1978, the Waxman Bill was proposed, which provided that
artists would receive a 5% royalty of the gross sales price of works resold
in interstate or foreign commerce for $1000 for more. 147 This bill was
conditioned on the creation of a National Commission of the Visual Arts
and a Visual Arts Fund under the Department of Treasury to enforce the
right, which provided that in order for an artist to receive the royalty, the
work would have to be registered with the Commission prior to resale. 14 8
The bill proposed that failure to make a royalty payment would result in
punitive damages of three times the amount of the royalty due or $5,000,
whichever was greater.1 49
In 1986, Senator Edward Kennedy proposed another bill that sought
to incorporate a resale royalty right in the United States, entitled the
Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986.150 This bill provided that a
seller pay a 7% royalty of the appreciated value of the work-the
difference between the purchase price and the sales price-when the
resale price was more than $500 and 140% higher than the price paid by
the seller.1 5 The following year Senator Kennedy introduced an amended
141. Id.
142.

1992 REPORT, supra note 137, at 75.

143. Id. at 75-76.
144. Kevin P. Ray, Droit de Suite: California Resale Royalty Revisited, GREENBERG
TRAURIG: CULTURAL ASSETS (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.gtlaw-culturalassets.com/2014/1 l/drol
t-de-suite-california-resale-royalty-revisited/.
145. 1992 REPORT, supra note 137, at iv.

146. Id. at vi.
147.

Id; see also 2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.

148.

2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.

149.
150.

Id at 6-7.
Id. at 7.

151.

Id.
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proposal called the Visual Artist Rights Act of 1987 that provided a 7%
royalty on sales of visual art sold for $1,000 or more and over 150% of
the purchase price paid by the seller, which also required artists and
sellers to register their works with the Copyright Office in order to qualify
for the royalty.1 52 Congress eventually adopted VARA, but it removed
the resale right provision from the bill, and instead, provided limited
moral rights for artists in certain situations.' 5 3 Although Congress did not
adopt a resale royalty right when it passed VARA, the Act did not
discredit the idea of a resale royalty right completely; instead, section
608(b) of VARA directed the Copyright Office and the Chair of the
National Endowment for the Arts to research the viability of future resale
royalty legislation.' 5 4

In response to this directive by VARA, the Copyright Office issued a
comprehensive examination of droit de suite in its 1992 Report."' The
Copyright Office's 1992 Report acknowledged that any droitdesuitelaw
enacted in the United States should be at the federal level. 5 6 The 1992
Report suggested enactment at the federal level rather than at the state
level because it feared that "[a]ny state resale royalty scheme may be
preempted under section 301 of the 1976 Act because it inhibits the
section 106 distribution right as modified by the section 109 'first sale'
doctrine."' 5 7 However, the 1992 Report concluded that the Copyright
Office was "not persuaded that sufficient economic and copyright policy
justification exists to establish droit de suite in the United States."'5 8 The
Office recognized, however, that "[s]hould the European Community
harmonize existing droit de suite laws, Congress may want to take
another look at the resale royalty, particularly if the Community decides
to extend the royalty to all its member States." 59
Only thirty-six countries had adopted a droit de suite law when the
1992 Report was published.1 6 0 However, in 2001, in an effort to
harmonize the resale royalty right across Europe, the European Union
adopted a directive requiring all E.U. Member States to implement resale
royalty legislation by 2006.161 The Directive required all E.U. Member
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.

155.

Id. at 8; see also 1992 REPORT, supra note 137.

156.
157.
158.
159.

1992 REPORT, supra note 137, at vi.
Id. at v-vi.
Id. at 149.
Id

160. 2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 8.
161. Moral Rights, TerminationRights, ResaleRoyalty, and Copyright Term: Report Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, IntellectualProp. and the Internet Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.

(2d Sess. 2014) (statement of Karyn A. Temple Claggett, Associate Register of Copyrights and
Director of Policy and International Affairs, U.S. Copyright Office), http://www.copyright.gov/
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States to "establish a royalty for art sales involving 'art market
professionals' that occur after the first transfer of the work by the
author."l6 2 To date, all Member States in the European Union have fully
implemented droit de suite laws, and over seventy countries around the
world provide the resale royalty right.1 63
3. Recent Attempts for Federal Legislation Governing Resale Royalty
Rights in the United States
Following compliance of all E.U. Member States to enact resale
royalty legislation in response to the E.U. Directive, resale royalty
legislation, once again, came under serious scrutiny in the United
States.1 64 In 2011, Representative Jerrold Nadler and Senator Herb Kohl
introduced the Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011.165 The following
year, Representative Nadler and Senator Kohl requested that the
Copyright Office follow up on its 1992 Report, which the Copyright
Office did in its 2013 Report by providing an updated analysis on the
issues surrounding visual artists and resale royalties in the United
States.1 66

a. Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011
On December 15, 2011, Representative Nadler introduced the Equity
for Visual Artists Act of 2011 (EVAA), for the purpose of amending the
copyright law to secure the rights of artists or works of visual art to
provide royalties.1 6 7 The EVAA sought to amend Section 106 of Title 17
of the U.S. Code by adding the following provision:
Whenever a work of visual art is sold as the result of auction of
that work by someone other than the artist who is the author of the
work, the entity that collects the money or other consideration paid
for the sale of the work shall, within 90 days of collecting such
money or other consideration, pay out of the proceeds of the sale a
royalty equal to 7 percent of the price. Such royalty shall be paid
to a visual artists' collecting society. The collecting society shall
distribute, no fewer than 4 times per year, 50 percent of the net
regstat/2014/regstat07l52014.html.
162. Id. (quoting Council Directive 2001/84/EC, art. 12(1), 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32-36 (EC),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?fileid=180301).
163.

2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 8.

164. Id.
165. Id.. at 8-9; see H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); S. 2000, 112th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2011).
166. See 2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 9-10.
167. H.R. 3688.
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royalty to the artist or his or her successor as copyright owner.
After payment to the artist or his or her successor as copyright
owner, the remaining 50 percent of the net royalty shall be
deposited into an escrow account established by the collecting
society for the purposes of funding purchases by nonprofit art
museums in the United States of works of visual art authored by
living artists domiciled in the United States. The right to receive
such royalty and the obligation to deposit the remaining share of
sale proceeds into the escrow account provided in this subsection
may not be waived by the artist or his successor as copyright
owner. Failure of the entity collecting the money or other
consideration resulting from the sale of the work to pay the royalty
provided under this section shall constitute an infringement of
copyright. Any such infringement shall be subject to the payment
of statutory damages under section 504.168
It did not come as a surprise that Congress did not enact the EVAA
into law; among other things, the EVAA was problematic due to its
narrow scope. This detailed and lengthy provision, provided that Section
106(b) of the Copyright Act be amended to require a royalty, equivalent
to 7% of the sales price of the visual art resold, to be paid to the visual
artist's collecting society within ninety days of the entity's collection of
such payment.1 69 The collecting society was then responsible for
distributing 50% of the net royalty to the artist or the artist's successor as
copyright owner. 170 The EVAA, in other words, required the collecting
society to set aside a royalty rate of 7% for resales in excess of $10,000
at large auction houses, half of which would go to the visual artists, and
the other half to nonprofit art museums in the United States. 171 With
respect to operating costs, the EVAA provided that the collecting
societies could collect up to 18% of the royalty to use toward the costs of
collecting and distributing the royalty to artists and their successors. 172
The EVAA further limited the scope of the legislation by prohibiting
the artist or successor from waiving the rights afforded to them by the
provision.1 73 Also, the EVAA implemented repercussions for
noncompliance of the provision, stating that failure of the entity
collecting the royalty to distribute the proper amount to the artist would
168. Id. § 3.
169. Mione, supra note 75, at 486.
170. Id.
171. Elisa D. Doll, The Equityfor Visual Artists Act of 2011 (EVAA): Craftingan Effective
&

Resale Royalty Scheme for the United States through Comparative Mediation, 24 IND. INT'L

COMP. L. REv. 461, 481 (2014); Mione, supra note 75, at 486-87.
172. Mione, supra note 75, at 487.
173. Id.
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constitute copyright infringement under the Copyright Act.1 74 One of the
more controversial limitations of the EVAA was its non-applicability to
sales of work with a gross sales price of less than $10,000, and the fact
that the EVAA would only apply to auction houses with annual sales of
$25 million or more.17 5 The latter restriction meant that the law would not
affect online or private sales of visual art.176
Among the many criticisms of the EVAA, the ultimate flaw of the
proposed bill was the fact that, at the end of the day, artists would not
benefit much by its enactment.17 7 Under the EVAA, an artist would be
compensated for the resale of her work only after subtracting 18%
percentof the royalty for administrative costs for the collecting society,
and then another half subtracted for the museum fund escrow. 78 In effect,
this would leave the artist with less than 3% of the total royalty paid.1 79
To illustrate EVAA's flaw in practice:
[A] painting or sculpture sold at Sotheby's for the minimum
threshold price of $10,000 would lead to a total amount of $700
being taken as a 7% royalty; removing 18% of that amount in
administrative costs would leave $574; half of that would go
toward the museum fund; and finally, the artist is left with $287
after a $10,000 sale.' 8 0
Apart from the little compensation the EVAA would ultimately
provide to the artist, the limiting scope of the EVAA to large auction
houses would likely lead to a significant number of visual art sales within
the private sector in order to avoid paying the royalty altogether.181
b. An Updated Analysis by the U.S. Copyright Office on Resale
Royalties: The 2013 Report
Due to the changes in law and practice that took place throughout the
two decades following the 1992 Report, the Copyright Office issued an
updated report in 2013 on the issue surrounding visual arts and resale
royalties in the United States.' 82 The issues with implementing a federal
droit de suite statute in the United States were acknowledged in the 2013
Report on Resale Royalties as "information problem[s]" that existed in
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 487, 491-92.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the art market.1 83 The 2013 Report recognized that
[a]ny assessment of the treatment of visual artists under U.S. law
suffers from a lack of independently verifiable data about the
operation of the art market and a resulting difficulty in determining
whether a resale royalty in particular would truly operate to place
artists on equal footing with other authors. 184
However, despite these issues and criticisms, the Copyright Office's
2013 Report supported the implementation of a federal droitde suite right
in the United States, and it found no impediment to the enactment of such
a right.18 5

The 2013 Report recognized the various legal changes and
developments since the 1992 Report, including European harmonization,
enactment of a resale royalty right by countries not associated with the
European Union, the unconstitutionality of the resale royalty right at the
state level, as evidenced by the CRAA, and changes within the art market
itself.1 86 With respect to the latter, the 2013 Report acknowledged that
the art market in the United States has experienced tremendous growth
since the 1990s.' 8 7 At the time the 1992 Report was issued, the art market
in the United States accounted for $9.7 billion; that same market has
increased exponentially over the past twenty years, estimated at $59
million in 2012.188 Additional changes in the art market include the
growth of the online market for visual art and the increase in popularity
of art fairs across the United States.' 89 Furthermore, the development of
various auction price databases, indexes, and news and analytics
resources has made the art market more "transparent" in the last twenty
years.1 90

The 2013 Report also took policy into consideration with respect to
implementing a federal resale royalty right in the United States.191 The
policy arguments that surround enacting a resale royalty right focus on
two main issues: "(1) the effect of a resale royalty on the U.S. art market
and (2) the extent to which the right would benefit U.S. visual artists."' 9 2
A critical factor in the policy considerations of implementing a resale
royalty right is the constitutional mandate found in Article I, Section 8 of
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
See id at 13-26.
Id. at 24.
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Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 66.
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the U.S. Constitution that empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Progress
of [S]cience and useful [A]rts, by securing for limited [T]imes to
[A]uthors and [I]nventors the exclusive [R]ight to their respective
[W]ritings and Discoveries[.]"' 9 3 Supporters of the resale royalty argue
that the right would encourage creativity of living artists who would be
motivated to create art today in anticipation of supporting their heirs after
their deaths, that a resale royalty right will inspire more individuals to
choose art as a career, and that it will encourage current artists to produce
more work.1 94 However, the 2013 Report found that there is insufficient
evidence to support the conclusions that a resale royalty right will
encourage creativity, and instead, focused on whether a resale royalty
would further the fundamental purposes of the Copyright Act.' 95
Supporters of the right maintain that a resale royalty has the potential of
incentivizing visual artists to "release more works of art into the stream
of commerce, because wider exposure may lead, in turn, to greater
popularity and more secondary sales."' 96
The 2013 Report's overall findings supported legislation of a resale
royalty right in the United States to address the inconsistency in the
treatment of artists under the current U.S. copyright system.' 97
Furthermore, the Copyright Office noted that there was no significant
evidence to support the policy arguments for or against adopting a resale
royalty right, and it found no legal or policy impediments to imposing
such a right.1 98 The report recommended that if Congress decided to
propose resale royalty legislation, the legislation should be written in a
way that "benefits the greatest number of artists while causing the least
amount of disruption in the art market." 99 The 2013 Report offered
several considerations for Congress to consider in striking this balance.2 00
c. The 2013 Report's Proposed Model for a Federal Droit de Suite
Statute in the United States
In its 2013 Report on resale royalties, the Copyright Office proposed
several legislative considerations for Congress to keep in mind when
drafting resale royalty legislation, if and when it ever decides to address
the resale royalty issue legislatively. 20 1 The first consideration involved
§ 8, cl. 8; 2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 36.

193.

U.S. CONST. art. I,
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See id. at 73-81.
Id. at 73.

2015]1

ED VARD MUNCH'S "THE SCREAM" SCREAMS FOR DROITDE SUITE

409

the types of sales that should be covered by the legislation: 202 "[a] resale
royalty law should be broad in scope, covering not only sales by large
auction houses, but also sales by other art market professionals." 20 3 The
Office found that a broader scope, such as the one used by the E.U.
Directive, would be more effective in advancing the legislation's goals. 204
The EVAA fell short of this by providing a very narrow scope with
respect to its coverage.
Next, the Office addressed the threshold value of the sales that should
be covered by the legislation, noting that "[a] resale royalty law should
include a minimum price threshold that is sufficiently low to cover a wide
range of sales, while not so low as to be offset by the administrative costs
of collecting and distributing the royalty." 205 Whereas the EVAA applied
to artwork sold for $10,000 or more, the reporter suggested that a
reasonable minimum requirement for artwork sold would range from
$1,000 to $5,000.206
The Office also had a suggestion for the types of work that should be
subject to a resale royalty, stating that "[a] resale royalty should apply
only to 'work[s] of visual art' as currently defined in Section 101 of the
Copyright Act." 207 With respect to an appropriate royalty rate, the Office
recommended that the rate fall between 3% and 5%, a range that was also
recommended by the 1992 Report, and one that is generally supported by
visual artists'artists societies. The Office noted that "[t]he rate of a resale
royalty should reflect multiple factors, including the amount needed to
incentivize creativity and the potential danger that it will raise overall
prices in the art market." 208 As the resale royalty rate in many countries
around the world falls within the 3 to 5% range, the Office acknowledged
that a similar resale royalty percentage would be appropriate in the United
States. 209 As to the length of time the resale royalty rate would be in
effect, the Office suggested that it follow a shorter term than the copyright
of the visual work, which is life of the author plus seventy years, and
instead limit the royalty term to the life of the artist.2 10
To minimize the likelihood of constitutional challenges to resale
royalty legislation, the Office suggested that Congress apply the
legislation prospectively. 2 1 1 This prospective application provides that
"the resale right would cover only those works created on or after the
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
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date on which the law becomes effective." 212 Furthermore, the Office
suggested that the resale royalty right should be inalienable and nonwaivable. 2 13 The Berne Convention provides for an "inalienable right" to
resale royalties in Article 14. The Office notes that for "U.S. law to follow
a different approach, there would arise a risk that other Member States
might deem the law insufficient for purposes of according reciprocal
benefits to U.S. artists."214 Also, the Office recommended that "any resale
royalty legislation should apply to foreign artists whose qualifying works
are sold in the United States." 215 Including a provision for foreign artists
is important for reciprocity considerations so the right can be enjoyed by
American artists whenever their works are sold in other Member States
of the Berne Convention, and vice versa. 2 16
Regarding collection and administration of the royalty, the Office
suggested that "a resale royalty system should be collectively managed
by private collecting societies, whose functions would be similar to those
of SoundExchange in the music context." 2 17 It also recommended that the
legislation limit the administrative fees charged by those entities to
guarantee that the artists receive the maximum possible payment from the
royalty charge. 2 1 8 This recommendation addresses another issue found in
the EVAA because the high administrative charges the legislation
allowed for would have left the artists with negligible rewards.
Furthermore, the Office questioned whether copyright registration
should be a prerequisite for receiving a resale royalty. The Office
suggested that Congress should consider whether "requiring copyright
registration of a work as a prerequisite to the collection of resale
royalties" is necessary. 2 19 For legislation to require that a work be
registered with the Office as a condition for receiving a resale royalty
would essentially limit the legislation to the United States exclusively. 220
ItIt would mean the United States would not be able to reap the
reciprocity benefits when a resale occurs in other Member States of the
Berne Convention. 22 1
The Office also had recommendations concerning the remedies
available for failure to comply with legislation, the right to information,
212. Id. (emphasis in original).
213. Id. at 79.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id
217. Id SoundExchange is an independent nonprofit performance rights organization that
collects and distributes digital performance royalties to featured artists and copyright holders.
SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com/about (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
218. 2013 REPORT, supra note 28, at 79.
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provisions for museums, and future review of any proposed law. 222 The
Office suggested that damages should "avoid any unduly harsh effects
and the adverse market impact that could result" from a harsh remedy. 22 3
A proper damages provision would be similar to the one proposed in the
1978 resale royalty bill, which "limit[ed] damages for intentional
violation to the greater of three times the royalty amount due or $5,000,
plus reasonable costs, including attorney['s] fees." 22 4 As for the right to
information, the Office recommended that Congress adopt guidelines
similar to that of the E.U. Directive, which required art market
professionals "'to furnish any information that may be necessary in order
to secure payment of royalties in respect of the resale' upon request from
an eligible artist or collective management organization within three
years of the resale." 225 The Office suggested "adopting a similar model,
perhaps by providing artists with a general right to relevant information
while directing the Copyright Office to promulgate regulations governing
the acquisition and handling of personal data by collecting societies." 226
On the other hand, the Office outright rejected a provision that would
provide a percentage of the royalties collected to be given to a museum. 22 7
The Office recognized that, "in order to fully effectuate the purposes of
the royalty, all net collections [should] be paid to visual artists." 2 28

Finally, the Office suggested that "[a]ny resale royalty legislation should
direct the Copyright Office to conduct a preliminary study of the law's
effectiveness and impact on the U.S. art market within a reasonable time
after its initial implementation." 229
d. American Royalties Too (ART) Act of 2014
The most recent resale royalty bill was introduced to Congress on
February 26, 2014.230 The American Royalties Too (ART) Act of 2014
expanded copyright owners' exclusive rights, allowing the copyright
owner "in the case of a work of visual art, to collect a royalty for the work
if the work is sold by a person other than the author of the work for a
price of not less than $5,000 as the result of an auction." 23 1 ART provided
a 5% royalty for the price paid for the work of visual art, or the payment
222. Id. at 80-81.
223. Id. at 80.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 81.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See American Royalties Too Act of 2014, S. 2045, 113th Cong. (2014),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/I 3th-congress/senate-bill/2045/text.
231. Id. § 3.
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of $35,000, whichever is less. 23 2 The bill slightly expanded the definition
of "work of visual art," defining it as "a painting, drawing, print,
sculpture, or photograph, existing either in the original embodiment or in
a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer... ."233 The bill placed the burden
on the auction conducting the sale to collect and pay the royalty to a visual
artists copyright-collecting society no later than ninety days after the date
of the auction. 234 The copyright-collecting society would then be
responsible for distributing the difference between the net royalty
attributable to the sales of the artist and the reasonable administrative
expenses to the artist or the artist's successors. 2 35 The bill also made the
right to receive the royalty inalienable, unassignable and unwaivable, and
it included a provision on an individual's eligibility to receive the royalty
payment, limiting the right to an individual "who is a citizen or domiciled
in the United States[,]" "who is a citizen of or domiciled in a country that
provides resale royalty rights[,]" or "whose work of visual art is first
created in the United States or in a country that provides resale royalty
rights. [.]" 23 6 This provision of the ART bill expressly would allow for
reciprocity with other Member States of the Berne Convention. The bill
also contained a reasonable remedies provision, providing that failure to
pay the royalty would constitute copyright infringement, and infringers
would be liable for either statutory damages or the full payment of the
royalty due. 237
E. Developments FollowingART, anda Discussion on Why Federal
Legislation is Needed in the United States
Unfortunately, ART's demise occurred the day the 114th Congress
took its seats on January 3, 2015.238 The fate of ART and resale royalty
legislation in general appears to be in the hands of the lobbyists. Federal
lobbying reports show that in the two years leading up to the introduction
of EVAA, the Visual Artists Rights Coalition and the Artists Rights
Society spent $280,000 on lobbyists, who included the former
commissioner of the USPTO, Bruce Lehman, and former congressional
staff member, John Weinfurter. 239 Major auction houses, such as
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
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238.
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Sotheby's and Christie's, strongly opposed the bill and have spent over
one million dollars in the last few years hiring well-known legal and
lobbying talent in Washington D.C. to lobby against the bill's passing.2 4 0
Auction houses, sellers, and museums are also strongly opposed to
enacting resale royalty legislation because they view the royalty as an
added tax that will raise the cost of doing business and reduce the overall
prices in the art market. 24 1 However, adversaries' fear of the alleged
substantial effect on the art market is unfounded. The reasonable resale
royalty percentage range as recommended by the Copyright Office would
implement a royalty on works of visual art that is less than the current
sales tax in most states. 2 42 It is not surprising that proponents and
opponents of a resale royalty right disagree about the extent to which such
a right would benefit or harm the secondary art market in the United
States.2 4 3 However, when compared to other countries with a similar
resale right in place, the presence of the right has proved to benefit the
secondary art market.24 4 The United Kingdom's 2008 report on its resale
royalty scheme concluded "the cost of administration does not appear
burdensome relative to the benefits to the artists." 245 Furthermore, there
is no conclusive proof in the U.K. or E.U. markets that secondary art
markets have suffered, directly or indirectly, from imposing a resale
royalty.24 6 In fact, adversaries of the right acknowledge the causation
issues with arguing that a decline in the secondary art market is due to the
presence of a resale royalty. 247 Auction houses themselves have said that
there could be a variety of reasons for downturns in the art market, such
as the recessionary economy and stiff competition in the industry. 248 The
European Commission concluded in its 2011 review that "[n]o clear
pattern can be established to link the loss of the [E.U.]'s share in the
global market for modem and contemporary art with the harmoni[z]ation
of provisions relating to the application of the resale right in the EU on 1
January 2006.",249 From a macroeconomic standpoint, implementing a
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/arts/design/auction-houses-taking-no-chances-on-a
merican-royalties-too-act.html.
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resale royalty right "'represents a negligible percentage of the value' of
the overall art market." 250 In the United Kingdom, "[o]n average the
resale royalties collected each year . .. equate to less than 0.15 percent of
the value of the entire UK art market, and 0.4 percent of the modem and
contemporary art market" turnover. 2 5 1
Furthermore, major auction houses fear that the resale royalties would
only benefit the wealthiest of artists and estates because well-known and
established artists are the ones whose art is most frequently sold in the
secondary market.2 5 2 With respect to scope, auction houses argue that
ART is flawed because it unfairly and narrowly targets auction houses,
while art galleries and private dealers who do not fall within the meaning
of "auction," as defined under the bill, would be free from the paying the
royalty. 2 5 3 ART's narrow scope, targeting only auction houses, may be
the only argument of the bill's adversaries with legitimate merit. Auction,
as defined under ART, includes an entity that conducts public sales of
visual art to the highest bidder, and which sold at least $1 million of works
of visual art during the previous year.2 54 Limiting the scope of the bill to
this extent does not accomplish the policy goals that this type of
legislation is meant to address, which goals include correcting the
injustice faced by visual artists under the current copyright regime. 2 5 5 The
Copyright Office's 2013 Report recommended that proposed legislation
be broad in scope in order to achieve these goals. 2 5 6
Regardless of its scope issues, ART died the day the 114th Congress
went into session earlier this year. 2 5 7 In order for a resale royalty right to
be considered going forward, a new bill will have to be introduced into
Congress. 2 5 8 Supporters of the right will have to draft yet another revision
of the bill, paying closer attention to the key legislative considerations the
Copyright Office expressed in its 2013 Report.2 59 Specifically, drafters of
the bill will have to tailor the law to ensure that the right benefits the
greatest number of artists with the least amount of disruption to the art
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market. 260
IV. CONCLUSION

The issue of implementing a resale royalty right in the United States
has come down to an issue of "fundamental fairness." 261 Congress has
emphasized the concept of droit de suite as an appropriate consideration
in copyright policy to address the injustice that visual artists face under
the current copyright regime.2 6 2 The current international trend of
implementing resale royalty right laws has made this a compelling and
timely issue for the United States.2 6 3 Furthermore, case law has proved
that implementation of a resale royalty right in the United States cannot
survive at the state level; rather, this is an issue for Congress to address
through federal legislation. The positive impacts of implementing a resale
royalty right in the United States outweigh the fears of the right's
adversaries. American fine artists should have the right to a resale royalty
because: (1) current copyright law unfairly prejudices fine artists by
limiting their ability to participate in the economic exploitation of their
work; (2) a resale royalty right will promote the creation of additional
works of fine art, thus fulfilling the original intent of the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution; (3) implementing a resale royalty law will
allow American artists to enjoy the reciprocity benefits allowed for under
the Berne Convention; and (4) a federal law will solve the constitutional
issues that state resale royalty laws have faced in the past. Famous artists,
Munch, Picasso, and Degas, have all faced the injustice that great wealth
in the arts rarely translates into great wealth for the artist. The time to
enact a federal resale royalty right to counter this known injustice faced
by artists is now.
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